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Abstract
When classes of structures are not first-order definable, we might still try to find
a nice description. There are two common ways for doing this. One is to expand the
language, leading to notions of pseudo-elementary classes, and the other is to allow
infinite conjuncts and disjuncts. In this paper we examine the intersection. Namely,
we address the question: Which classes of structures are both pseudo-elementary and
Lω1ω-elementary? We find that these are exactly the classes that can be defined by an
infinitary formula that has no infinitary disjunctions.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that many properties are not definable in elementary first-order logic, even
by a theory rather than a single sentence. Common examples are the property (of graphs)
of being connected, the property (of abelian groups) of being torsion, and the property (of
linear orders) of being well-founded. To capture such properties, one can pass to extensions of
elementary first-order logic. This paper is about a characterization of the common expressive
power of two such extensions.
The first extension of elementary first-order logic that we consider is to allow countably
infinite conjunctions and disjunctions; this is, morally, similar to allowing quantifiers over
the (standard) natural numbers. One can then define properties such as being torsion by
saying “for each group element x, there is n such that nx = 0”, or formally,
(∀x)⩔
n∈N
nx = 0.
This work grew out of initial discussions with Vakili about the generality of expressing properties not
definable in first-order logic in a pseudo-elementary way, and whether such phenomena might be of use for
model checking (as the pseudo-elementary definability of graph reachability was used for model checking by
Vakili in his thesis [Vak16] and with the second author in [VD14]).
∗Partially supported by Canadian NSERC Discovery Grant 312501.
†Supported by an NSERC Banting Fellowship.
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This infinitary logic is known as Lω1ω. One loses compactness, but gains other powerful tools.
For example, every countable structure is described, up to isomorphism among countable
structures, by a sentence of Lω1ω [Sco65].
The second extension of elementary first-order logic is to allow existential second-order
quantifiers. For example, the property of a linear order being non-well-founded can be
defined by the sentence “there is a set with no least element”. We say that such a property
is pseudo-elementary. More formally, a property P of τ -structures is pseudo-elementary if
there is an expanded language τ∗ ⊇ τ and an τ∗-sentence ϕ (or τ∗-theory T ) such that the
τ -structures admitting an τ∗-expansion to a model of ϕ (respectively T ) are exactly the
structures satisfying P . We will describe both of these extensions of first-order logic in more
detail later.
These two extensions of elementary first-order logic have different descriptive powers.
For example, the property of being non-well-founded is pseudo-elementary but not Lω1ω-
definable. Also, the negation of a pseudo-elementary property is not necessarily pseudo-
elementary, but the negation of an Lω1ω-definable property is again Lω1ω-definable. Never-
theless, there are properties that are not elementary first-order definable, but that are both
pseudo-elementary and Lω1ω-definable. The property of a graph being disconnected is such
an example; we provide a more detailed discussion of various examples in Section 3. The
main result of this paper is a complete classification of such properties.
Theorem 1.1. Let K be a class of structures closed under isomorphism. The following are
equivalent:
• K is both a pseudo-elementary (PC∆) class and Lω1ω-elementary.
• K is defined by a ⩕-sentence.
There is some notation in this theorem that we must explain. First, there are some subtleties
in the definition of what it means for a property to be pseudo-elementary, and in fact there
are four different natural definitions (giving rise to three distinct notions). Two of them are
as follows.
Definition 1.2. We say that a class K of τ -structures is a PC-class if there is a language
τ∗ ⊇ τ and an elementary first-order τ∗-sentence φ such that
K = {M ∣ there is an τ∗-structure M∗ expanding M with M∗ ⊧ φ}.
We say that K is a PC∆-class if φ is replaced by an elementary first-order theory.
So the theorem above is concerned with pseudo-elementary classes where one is allowed to
use a theory in the definition.
The ⩕-sentences in the theorem are the Lω1ω sentences which (in normal form) involve
infinitary conjunctions, but no infinitary disjunctions. For example, the property of being
infinite is definable by the ⩕-sentence
⩕
n∈N
∃x1, . . . , xn(⋀
i≠j
xi ≠ xj).
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The negation, the property of being finite, is Lω1ω-definable by the sentence
⩔
n∈N
∀x1, . . . , xn(⋁
i≠j
xi = xj)
but this sentence is not a ⩕-sentence because it involves an infinitary disjunct.
Definition 1.3. The ⩕-formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• every finitary quantifier-free formula is a ⩕-formula
• if ϕ is a ⩕-formula, then so are (∃x)ϕ and (∀x)ϕ
• if (ϕi)i∈ω are ⩕-formulas with finitely many free variables, then so is ⩕i∈ω ϕi.
In one direction, the proof of Theorem 1.1 passes through a modification of the proof of
Craig Interpolation for Lω1ω. This was originally proved by Lopez-Escobar [LE65] who also
gave the following corollary: a property which is both pseudo-elementary and co-pseudo-
elementary with respect to Lω1ω (i.e., both Σ
1
1 and Π
1
1) is actually Lω1ω-definable. So it is
not too surprising that we can use similar ideas.
In the other direction, the proof passes through the coding of computable formulas in
expansions of models of arithmetic. One of the results along the way is of independent
interest.
Theorem 1.4. Let K be a class of structures in a finite language that is axiomatized by
a computable ⩕-sentence. Then K is pseudo-elementarily defined using a single sentence
(PC ′).
We have not yet defined the PC′ classes, but they are similar to the PC classes in that they
are axiomatized with a single sentence rather than a theory. (We note that for classes which
have only infinite models, PC and PC′ coincide.) In particular, noting the fact that the
conjunction of the sentences in an elementary first-order theory is a ⩕-sentence, we get the
following corollary.
Corollary 1.5. Every computably axiomatizable class in a finite language is a PC′ class.
What this says is that an elementary class that has an infinite but computable axiomatization
can actually be axiomatized by a single sentence in an expanded language. Unfortunately,
we do not know how to reverse these results. We have the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1.6. A PC or PC′ class which is also Lω1ω-axiomatizable is axiomatizable by a
computable ⩕-sentence.
The reader may wonder here why the connection with computability theory arises. It is,
essentially, because a single elementary first-order sentence forms a computable theory with
a computably enumerable set of consequences, and, on the other hand, that a computable
set has a an elementary first-order Σ1 definition in arithmetic.
The following result, in the special case of classes which are closed under substructures,
has been known since Tarski [Tar54a, Tar54b] and Mal’cev [Mal41].
3
Theorem 1.7 (Mal’cev, Tarski, see Theorem 6.6.7 of [Hod08] or Theorem 9.14 of [HH02]). If
K is a PC∆-class which is closed under substructures, then it axiomatized by a set of universal
sentences. Moreover, if the theory T by which K is PC∆ is computably enumerable, then so
is the set of universal sentences.
It is obvious that a class axiomatized by universal sentences is PC∆ and closed under sub-
structures. We get the following new reversal of the “moreover” clause:
Theorem 1.8. Let K be a class of structures closed under isomorphism. The following are
equivalent:
• K is a PC′-class that is closed under substructures,
• K is axiomatized by a computably enumerable universal theory.
The paper is laid out as follow. In Section 2 we introduce formal definitions of infinitary
logic and pseudo-elementary classes and some basic results. In Section 3, we will give several
examples. In Section 4, we prove an interpolation theorem which gives one direction of
Theorem 1.1. Finally, in Section 5 we prove the other direction by coding infinitary sentences
into models of arithmetic.
2 Notation and Definitions
2.1 Infinitary Logic
For the most part, we follow Marker’s new book [Mar16]. We want to be precise with our
definitions here, because we will need to encode infinitary formulas in first-order sentences.
We first define Lω1ω formulas. Throughout the paper, let τ be a countable language.
Definition 2.1. The Lω1ω(τ)-formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• every atomic τ -formula is an Lω1ω(τ)-formula,
• if ϕ is an Lω1ω(τ)-formula, then so are ¬ϕ, (∃x)ϕ and (∀x)ϕ,
• if (ϕi)i∈ω are Lω1ω(τ)-formulas with finitely many free variables, then so are ⩕i∈ω ϕi
and ⩔i∈ω ϕi.
In general, we will drop the reference to τ when it is clear what we mean.
Definition 2.2. An Lω1ω formula is in Lω1ω normal form if the ¬ only occurs applied to
atomic formulas.
Every Lω1ω can be placed into a normal form. The negation ¬ϕ of a sentence ϕ in normal
form is not immediately in normal form itself. This gives rise to the formal negation ∼ϕ,
which is logically equivalent to ¬ϕ but is in normal form.
Definition 2.3. For any Lω1ω-formula ϕ, the formula ∼ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
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• if ϕ is atomic, ∼ϕ is ¬ϕ,
• ∼¬ϕ is ϕ, ∼(∃x)ϕ is (∀x)∼ϕ and ∼(∀x)ϕ is (∃x)∼ϕ,
• ∼⩕i∈ω ϕi is ⩔i∈ω ∼ϕi and ∼⩔i∈ω ϕi is ⩕i∈ω ∼ϕi.
We repeat again the definition of a ⩕-formula.
Definition 2.4. An Lω1ω-sentence ϕ is a ⩕-formula if it can be written in normal form
without any infinite disjunctions. More concretely, the ⩕-formulas are defined inductively
as follows:
• every finitary quantifier-free sentence is a ⩕-formula,
• if ϕ is a ⩕-formula, then so are (∃x)ϕ and (∀x)ϕ,
• if (ϕi)i∈ω are ⩕-formulas with finitely many free variables, then so is ⩕i∈ω ϕi.
An Lω1ω formula is computable if, essentially, there is a computable syntactic represen-
tation of the formula. To define the computable Lω1ω formulas, we will encode in a labeled
tree the way that a formula is built from atomic formulas. The labeled trees build formulas
in normal form. The condition (a) below is somewhat non-standard in that we allow dis-
junctions but not conjunctions; this is merely a cosmetic change which will make our lives
easier later.
Definition 2.5. Assume that we have a fixed Go¨del coding of atomic τ -formulas, connec-
tives, and quantifiers. A labeled tree is a non-empty tree T ⊆ ω<ω with functions l and v such
that for each σ ∈ T , one of the following is true:
(a) σ is a terminal node of T and l(σ) = ⌜ψ⌝ where ψ is a finite disjunct of atomic and
negated atomic formulas, and {xi ∣ i ∈ v(σ)} is the set of free variables in ψ;
(b) l(σ) = ⌜∃xi⌝, σˆ0 is the unique successor of σ in T , and v(σ) = v(σˆ0) ∖ {i};
(c) l(σ) = ⌜∀xi⌝, σˆ0 is the unique successor of σ in T , and v(σ) = v(σˆ0) ∖ {i};
(d) l(σ) = ⌜⩕⌝ and v(σ) = ⋃σˆi∈T v(σˆi) and is finite;
(e) l(σ) = ⌜⩔⌝ and v(σ) = ⋃σˆi∈T v(σˆi) and is finite.
A formula code is a well-founded labeled tree (T, l, v). A sentence code is a formula code
where v(∅) = ∅. The formula coded by a formula code (T, l, v) can be defined inductively
in the obvious way. A formula is computable if it has a computable formula code, i.e., if T ,
l, and v are computable. Moreover, this relativizes: a formula is C-computable if it has a
C-computable formula code.
Every formula is C-computable for sets C of sufficiently high degree. A computable ⩕-
formula is just one that has a computable formula code that does not involve any infinitary
disjunctions.
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Definition 2.6. We say ϕ is a (C-)computable⩕-formula if ϕ has a (C-)computable formula
code (T, l, v) such that for no σ ∈ T do we have l(σ) = ⌜⩔⌝.
It seems possible that a formula might be both a computable Lω1ω-sentence, and a ⩕-
sentence, without being a computable ⩕-sentence. This is analogous to the fact that a
sentence might be both computable Lω1ω and infinitary Π
0
1 without being computable Π
0
1.
The satisfaction relation for Lω1ω is easy to define, but we will make use of the following
witnesses to the truth value of a formula. If η is a (possibly partial) variable assignment, we
will use the notation ηx↦a to denote the modification of η to map x to a.
Definition 2.7. Let M be a model and (T, l, v) a labeled tree. We define “f is a truth
definition for (T, l, v) in M” as follows:
• The domain of f is pairs (σ, η) where σ ∈ T and η is an valuation of the free variables,
and f(σ, η) ∈ {0,1}.
• If l(σ) = ⌜ψ⌝ an atomic L-formula, then f(σ, η) = 1 if and only if ψ is true in M when
we use η to assign the free variables.
• If l(σ) = ⌜∃xi⌝ then f(σ, η) = 1 if and only if for some a inM we have f(σˆ0, ηxi↦a) = 1.
• If l(σ) = ⌜∀xi⌝ then f(σ, η) = 1 if and only if for all a ∈ M, f(σˆ0, ηxi↦a) = 1.
• If l(σ) = ⌜⩔⌝ then f(σ, η) = 1 if and only if there is an i such that σˆi ∈ T and
f(σˆi, η) = 1.
• If l(σ) = ⌜⩕⌝ then f(σ, η) = 1 if and only if for every i such that σˆi ∈ T , f(σˆi, η) = 1.
If ϕ is a formula with code (T, l, v), M⊧ ϕ(a¯) if and only if there is a truth definition f for
(T, l, v) in M with f(∅, η) = 1, where η is the assignment of the free variables to a¯.
We can even keep track of the existential witnesses that make a formula true.
Definition 2.8. A Skolem function forM and (T, l, v) is a function g which assigns to each
σ ∈ T and valuation on v(σ) an element of M. We define “f is a truth definition for (T, l, v)
with respect to g in M” by replacing the third condition above with:
• If l(σ) = ⌜∃xi⌝ then f(σ, η) = 1 if and only if for a = g(σ, η) we have f(σˆ0, ηxi↦a) = 1.
If f is a truth definition for (T, l, v) in M, then there is a Skolem function g such that f is
a truth definition with respect to g.
2.2 Pseudo-elementary Classes
In this section, we follow the book by Hodges [Hod08]. There are four different types of
pseudo-elementary classes: PC, PC′, PC∆, and PC
′
∆. The ∆ means that we are allowed
a full theory rather than a single sentence, and the ′ means that we are allowed to add
additional sorts (elements) to the structure. PC and PC∆ have already been defined, but
we repeat the definition.
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Definition 2.9. We say that a class K of L-structures is a PC-class if there is a language
τ∗ ⊇ τ and an elementary first-order τ∗ sentence φ such that
K = {M ∣ there is a τ∗-structure M∗ expanding M with M∗ ⊧ φ}.
We say that K is a PC∆-class if φ is replaced by an elementary first-order theory.
The classes PC′ and PC′∆ are a little more complicated to define. We need the following
definition, which one should think of as throwing away a sort from a structure.
Definition 2.10. Let τ ⊆ τ∗ be a pair of languages, with a unary predicate P ∈ τ∗∖τ . Given
a τ∗-structure A, we denote by AP the substructure of A ∣ τ whose domain is PA (if this is
a τ -structure; otherwise AP is not defined).
The classes PC′ and PC′∆ differ from PC and PC∆ respectively in that in addition to ex-
panding the language, one is allowed to add additional elements.
Definition 2.11. We say that a class K of τ -structures is a PC′-class if there is a language
τ∗ ⊇ τ , with a unary relation P ∈ τ∗ ∖ τ , and a τ∗-formula φ, such that
K = {AP ∣ A ⊧ φ and AP is defined}.
We say that K is a PC′∆-class if φ is a first-order theory.
Note that, if the language is finite (or we are dealing with a PC′∆-class) it suffices to ask that
K = {AP ∣ A ⊧ φ}
as φ can say that AP is defined.
Though we have four different definitions, they give rise to only three different notions
(and only two if we consider classes which consist only of infinite structures).
Theorem 2.12 (Theorem 5.2.1 of [Hod08]). Let K be a class of structures.
• K is a PC∆-class if and only if it is a PC
′
∆-class.
• If all the structures in K are infinite, then K is a PC-class if and only if it is a PC′-
class.
In Example 3.5 we give a class which is PC′ but not PC.
The proof of the first point in [Hod08] is not obvious and quite interesting. For the
second, essentially the only reason that PC and PC′ are different is that the model might be
finite; if a model is infinite, one could just have the elements of the model “wear two hats”,
on the one hand being the domain of the expansion of the original model, and on the other
hand playing the role of the elements of the new sort P . In our proofs below, we want to
add on a model of arithmetic to a given structure; if the structure was finite, then as every
model of arithmetic is infinite, we must add new elements. This is why it is PC′ and not PC
that appears in, for example, Theorem 1.4.
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3 Examples
We give here a few examples of properties that are definable in various combinations of
expansions of elementary first-order logic, including some applications of the theorems.
Example 3.1. Let τ = {R} the language of graphs. The class K of non-connected graphs is
a PC-class. Indeed, an undirected graph G = (G,R) is disconnected if and only if there is a
binary relation C of connectedness such that
• (∀x)(∀y)[R(x, y)→ C(x, y)],
• (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[C(x, y) ∧C(y, z)→ C(x, z)], and
• ¬(∀x)(∀y)C(x, y).
An undirected graph G is also disconnected if and only if
(∃x ≠ y)⩕
n∈ω
(∀u0, . . . , un)[x ≠ u0 ∨ ¬R(u0, u1) ∨ ¬R(u1, u2) ∨⋯∨ ¬R(un−1, un) ∨ un ≠ y].
So K is also defined by a ⩕-sentence.
Example 3.2. Let τ = {<} the language of linear orders. The class K of non-well-founded
linear orders is a PC-class as a linear order (S,<) is non-well-founded if and only if there is
a unary relation U such that
(∀x)[x ∈ U → (∃y)[y ∈ U ∧ y < x]].
K is not definable by any Lω1ω formula.
Example 3.3. Let τ be any language and φ a τ -sentence. The class K of infinite models
of φ is a PC-class as A ⊧ φ is infinite if and only if there is a linear order < on A such that(∀x)(∃y)[x < y]. K is also defined by the ⩕-sentence
⩕
n∈ω
(∃x0, . . . , xn)[⋀
i≠j
xi ≠ xj] .
Example 3.4. Orderable groups are a PC-class. They are also universally axiomatizable
by saying that every finite subset can be ordered in a way that is compatible with the group
operation.
Example 3.5. There is a c.e. universal theory T whose models do not form a PC-class;
by Theorem 1.8 they are, however, a PC′-class. The language of T will be the language
of graphs. Fix an enumeration of the sentences φn in finite languages Ln expanding the
language of graphs. Note that for every finite graph G, we can decide effectively whether
there is an expansion of G to a model of φn. For each n, let Cn be cycle of length n. Then,
let T be the theory that says that there is no cycle of length n for exactly those n where Cn
does not have an expansion to a model of φn. Note that T is c.e. and universal, and that it
is different from each PC-class.
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4 An Application of Craig Interpolation
To prove the direction (1) implies (2) of Theorem 1.1, we will adapt a proof of the Craig Inter-
polation Theorem for Lω1ω. The proof we adapt is not the original proof by Lopez-Escobar,
but one that appears in the book by Marker [Mar16]. We begin with a few preliminaries.
Lemma 4.1. If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are ⩕-formulas, ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 is equivalent to a ⩕-formula.
Proof. We argue by induction on the complexity of ϕ1 and ϕ2 together. If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are
both finitary quantifier-free, then so is ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. For the inductive steps, we will give the
argument which reduces the complexity of ϕ1; the arguments for ϕ2 are similar.
If ϕ1 is of the form (Qx)ϕ′1(x), where Q is either ∃ or ∀, then ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 is equivalent
to (Qv)[ϕ′1(v) ∨ ϕ2] where v is not free in ϕ2; by the inductive hypothesis, ϕ′1(v) ∨ ϕ2 is
equivalent to a ⩕-formula and so (Qv)[ϕ′1(v) ∨ϕ2] is as well.
Finally, if ϕ1 is of the form⩕φ∈X φ, where each φ is a⩕-formula, then ϕ1∨ϕ2 is equivalent
to ⩕φ∈X[φ ∨ϕ2], and by the induction hypothesis, each φ ∨ ϕ2 is a ⩕-formula.
The proof of Craig Interpolation makes use of consistency properties. Consistency proper-
ties are the infinitary equivalent of Henkin-style constructions in finitary logic. The following
definition, due to Makkai, is what we need to do to perform such a construction.
Definition 4.2 (Definition 4.1 of [Mar16]). Let C be a countable collection of new constants.
A consistency property Σ is a collection of countable sets σ of Lω1ω-sentences with the
following properties. For σ ∈ Σ:
1. if µ ⊆ σ, then µ ∈ Σ;
2. if φ ∈ σ, then ¬φ ∉ σ;
3. if ¬φ ∈ σ, then σ ∪ {∼ φ} ∈ Σ;
4. if ⩕φ∈X φ ∈ σ, then for all φ ∈ X , σ ∪ {φ} ∈ Σ;
5. if ⩔φ∈X φ ∈ σ, then there is φ ∈ X such that σ ∪ {φ} ∈ Σ;
6. if (∀v)φ(v) ∈ σ, then for all c ∈ C, σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ;
7. if (∃v)φ(v) ∈ σ, then there is c ∈ C such that σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ;
8. let t be a term with no variables and let c, d ∈ C,
(a) if c = d ∈ σ, then σ ∪ {d = c} ∈ Σ;
(b) if c = t ∈ σ and φ(t) ∈ σ, then σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ;
(c) there is e ∈ C such that σ ∪ {e = t} ∈ Σ.
A consistency property is in some sense a recipe for building a model.
Theorem 4.3 (Model Existence Theorem; see Theorem 4.1.6 of [Mar16]). If Σ is a consis-
tency property and σ ∈ Σ, there is M ⊧ σ.
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We are now ready to prove our variant of the Craig Interpolation Theorem. We strengthen
the hypotheses to assume that one of the sentences is a ⩕-sentence, and in return, we get
that the interpolant is also a ⩕-sentence. The proof follows the same structure as that of
the Craig Interpolation Theorem in [Mar16] (Theorem 4.3.1).
Theorem 4.4 (Variation on Craig Interpolation Theorem). Suppose φ1 is a ⩕-sentence and
φ2 is an Lω1ω-sentence with φ1 ⊧ φ2. There is a ⩕-sentence θ such that φ1 ⊧ θ, θ ⊧ φ2, and
every relation, function and constant symbol occurring in θ occurs in both φ1 and φ2.
Proof. Let C be a countable collection of new constants. Let τi be the smallest language
containing φi and C, and let τ = τ1 ∩ τ2.
Let Σ be the collection of finite σ containing only finitely many new constants that can
be written as σ = σ1 ∪ σ2, where σ1 is a finite set of ⩕-τ1-sentences and σ2 is a finite set of
τ2-sentences, and such that for all τ -sentences ψ1 and ψ2, with ψ1 a ⩕-sentence, if σ1 ⊧ ψ1
and σ2 ⊧ ψ2 then ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is satisfiable.
In the rest of the proof, we make the convention that if σ ∈ Σ and we write σ = σ1 ∪ σ2,
then σ1 and σ2 are the witnesses that σ ∈ Σ, i.e., σ1 consists of ⩕-τ2-sentences, σ2 consists
of τ2-sentences, and they satisfy the satisfiability condition above.
We claim that Σ is a consistency property. The following claim will verify many of the
conditions.
Claim. Fix σ ∈ Σ and write σ = σ1 ∪ σ2. If φ is a τi-sentence (and a ⩕-sentence if i = 1)
with σi ⊧ φ, then σ ∪ {φ} ∈ Σ.
Proof. We will show the case i = 1. We can write σ∪{φ} = (σ1∪{φ})∪σ2. If σ1∪{φ} ⊧ ψ1 and
σ2 ⊧ ψ2, with ψ1 a ⩕-sentence, then since σ1 ⊧ φ, σ1 ⊧ ψ1. Hence ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is satisfiable.
We now check the conditions of a consistency property.
1. If µ ⊆ σ with σ ∈ Σ, write µ = µ1 ∪µ2 and σ = σ1 ∪ σ2 where µ1 ⊆ σ1 and µ2 ⊆ σ2. Given
µ1 ⊧ ψ1 and µ2 ⊧ ψ2, we have σ1 ⊧ ψ1 and σ2 ⊧ ψ2; hence ψ1∧ψ2 is satisfiable. So µ ∈ Σ.
2. If φ,¬φ ∈ σ = σ1 ∪ σ2, say φ,¬φ ∈ σi, σi ⊧ φ ∧ ¬φ which is not satisfiable. The other
possible case is that φ ∈ σi, ¬φ ∈ σj , i ≠ j, in which case σi ⊧ φ and σj ⊧ ¬φ, and φ∧¬φ
is not satisfiable.
3. This follows from the claim.
4. This follows from the claim.
5. Write σ = σ1 ∪ σ2. We have two cases which are different, depending on whether
⩔φ∈X φ ∈ σ1 or ⩔φ∈X φ ∈ σ2.
First suppose that ⩔φ∈X φ ∈ σ2. Let σ2,φ = σ2 ∪ {φ}. We claim that for some φ ∈ X ,
σ2,φ ∪ σ1 ∈ Σ. If not, then for each φ ∈ X there are τ -sentences ψ2,φ and ψ1,φ, with
ψ1,φ a ⩕-sentence, such that σ2,φ ⊧ ψ2,φ and σ1 ⊧ ψ1,φ, and such that ψ2,φ ∧ ψ1,φ is
unsatisfiable. So ψ2,φ ⊧ ¬ψ1,φ. Since
σ2 ⊧ ⩔
φ∈X
φ
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we have that
σ2 ⊧ ⩔
φ∈X
ψ2,φ.
On the other hand,
σ1 ⊧ ⩕
φ∈X
ψ1,φ.
This formula is a ⩕-sentence as each ψ1,φ is. Finally,
⩔
φ∈X
ψ2,φ ⊧ ¬⩕
φ∈X
ψ1,φ
which contradicts that σ ∈ Σ.
Now suppose that ⩔φ∈X φ ∈ σ1; then X is finite. We begin in a similar way as before.
Let σ1,φ = σ1 ∪ {φ}. We claim that for some φ ∈ X , σ1,φ ∪ σ2 ∈ Σ. If not, there for each
φ ∈X there are τ -sentences ψ1,φ and ψ2,φ, with ψ1,φ a ⩕-sentence, such that σ1,φ ⊧ ψ1,φ
and σ2 ⊧ ψ2,φ, and such that ψ1,φ ∧ ψ2,φ is unsatisfiable. So ψ1,φ ⊧ ¬ψ2,φ. Since
σ1 ⊧ ⩔
φ∈X
φ
we have that
σ1 ⊧ ⩔
φ∈X
ψ1,φ.
As X is finite, by Lemma 4.1 this is equivalent to a ⩕-sentence. On the other hand,
σ2 ⊧ ⩕
φ∈X
ψ2,φ
and
⩔
φ∈X
ψ1,φ ⊧ ¬⩕
φ∈X
ψ2,φ
which contradicts that σ ∈ Σ.
6. This follows from the claim as (∀x)φ(x) ⊧ φ(c) for all c ∈ C.
7. If (∃x)φ(x) ∈ σ, then choose c ∈ C which does not appear in σ. Suppose that (∃x)φ(x) ∈
σ1; the case where (∃x)φ(x) ∈ σ2 is similar. We claim that σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ. Suppose
that σ1 ∪ {φ(c)} ⊧ ψ1 and σ2 ⊧ ψ2, where ψ1 is a ⩕-sentence. Write ψ1 = θ1(c)
and ψ2 = θ2(c). We have σ1 ⊧ φ(c) → θ1(c), and so since c does not appear in σ1,
σ1 ⊧ (∀x)[φ(x) → θ1(x)]. Similarly, σ2 ⊧ (∀x)θ2(x). Also, σ1 ⊧ (∃x)φ(x) and so
σ1 ⊧ (∃x)θ1(x). Since (∃x)φ(x) ∈ σ1, φ(x) is a ⩕-formula. So (∃x)θ1(x) ∧ (∀x)θ2(x)
is satisfiable, say in a model M. Note that the constant c does not appear in the
formula (∃x)θ1(x) ∧ (∀x)θ2(x), so we may choose the interpretation of c in M such
that M ⊧ θ1(c). Then M ⊧ θ1(c) ∧ θ2(c).
8. let t be a term with no variables and let c, d ∈ C,
(a) This follows from the claim.
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(b) Suppose c = t ∈ σ and φ(t) ∈ σ. Write σ = σ1 ∪ σ2. Consider µ = σ ∪ {φ(c)} =
σ1 ∪ σ2 ∪ {φ(c)}. Suppose c = t ∈ σi and φ(t) ∈ σj . The case i = j follows from the
claim, so we consider the case i ≠ j. Suppose that σi ⊧ ψi and σj ∪ {φ(c)} ⊧ ψj .
Then σi ⊧ c = t ∧ ψi and σj ⊧ c = t → ψj , so c = t ∧ ψi ∧ (c = t → ψi) is satisfiable.
So ψi ∧ ψj is satisfiable.
(c) Pick e ∈ C which does not appear in σ = σ1 ∪ σ2. Then if σ1 ∪ {e = t} ⊧ ψ1 and
σ2 ∪{e = t} ⊧ ψ2, write ψ1 = θ1(e) and ψ2 = θ2(e). Then since e does not appear in
σ1 or σ2, σ1 ⊧ θ1(t) and σ2 ⊧ θ2(t). Thus θ1(t)∧θ2(t) is satisfiable. Given a model
of θ1(t) ∧ θ2(t), setting the interpretation of c to t, we get a model of ψ1 ∧ψ2. So
ψ1 ∧ψ2 is satisfiable.
Since φ1 ⊧ φ2, {φ1,¬φ2} ∉ Σ as otherwise by the Model Existence Theorem there would
be a model of φ1 ∧ ¬φ2. By definition of Σ, there are τ -sentences ψ1 and ψ2, with ψ1 a
⩕-sentence, such that φ1 ⊧ ψ1, ¬φ2 ⊧ ψ2, and ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is not satisfiable. So we have that
φ1 ⊧ ψ1, ψ1 ⊧ ¬ψ2, and ¬ψ2 ⊧ φ2. Hence φ1 ⊧ ψ1 and ψ1 ⊧ φ2.
Thus ψ1 is the desired interpolant, except that it may contain constants from C. Write
ψ1 = θ(c¯), where θ is an τ -formula with no constants from c¯. Neither φ1 nor φ2 contains
constants from C, and so φ1 ⊧ (∀x¯)θ(x¯) and (∃x¯)θ(x¯) ⊧ φ2. Since (∀x¯)θ(x¯) ⊧ (∃x¯)θ(x¯), we
can take (∀x¯)θ(x¯) as the interpolant.
We get the following corollary, which is (1) implies (2) of Theorem 1.1. Interestingly,
when we apply the interpolation theorem in the proof, one of the languages contains the
other (i.e., we have τ1 ⊇ τ2 so that τ = τ1 ∩ τ2 = τ2). If it were not for our added assumptions
on the form of the formulas involved, finding an interpolant would be trivial as we could just
take the sentence in the smaller language.
Corollary 4.5. Let K be a class of τ -structures closed under isomorphism. If K is both a
PC∆-class and Lω1ω-elementary, then it is defined by a ⩕-sentence.
Proof. Let τ∗ ⊇ τ be an expanded language and let X be a set of first-order sentences such
that K is the class of reducts to τ of models of ψ1 = ⩕φ∈X φ. Note that ψ1 is a ⩕-sentence.
Let ψ2 be an Lω1ω(τ)-sentence defining K. We have that ψ1 ⊧ ψ2, so by the Interpolation
Theorem, there is a ⩕-τ -sentence θ such that ψ1 ⊧ θ and θ ⊧ ψ2.
Every M ∈ K has an expansion which is a model of ψ1 and hence is itself a model of θ;
and every model of θ is a model of ψ2, and hence in the class K. So θ defines K.
5 Coding Sentences in Models of Arithmetic
This section is devoted to proving the direction (2) implies (1) of Theorem 1.1. First, we
will recall some facts about weak theories of arithmetic.
5.1 Weak Theories of Arithmetic
We will work with PA−, Peano arithmetic without the axiom of induction, which is the
axiomatization of the non-negative parts of discretely ordered rings. A good reference for
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many of the facts that we use is the book by Kaye [Kay91]. We use PA− because it is finitely
axiomatizable, and yet strong enough for our coding.
Recall that every model of PA− is an end extension of N. Moreover, if N is an end
extension of M, and ϕ is a Π1 formula in the language of arithmetic, then if N ⊧ ϕ then
M ⊧ ϕ. So if a Π1 sentence holds in any model of PA−, then it holds in N.
We will also use the fact that computable subsets of N are definable by Σ1 and Π1
formulas.
Theorem 5.1 (See Corollary 3.5 of [Kay91]). Fix C ⊆ N. A ⊆ Nk is C-computable if and
only if there is a Σ1 formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) and a Π1 formula ψ(x1, . . . , xk) in the language
of arithmetic with an additional unary predicate such that, for all a¯ ∈ N, a¯ ∈ A if and only if(N,C) ⊧ ϕ(a¯).
We will use this fact implicitly throughout to write computable predicates inside of a formula
of arithmetic, meaning that one should replace the computable predicate by the correspond-
ing Σ1 or Π1 formula.
5.2 Adding Tuples to a Theory
Fix a language τ . We will describe a theory T in an expanded language which is essentially
the theory of a τ -structure augmented with finite tuples from that structure. Because we
will be working within elementary first-order logic, we cannot guarantee that the tuples
are actually finite, but rather that their lengths take values within an associated model of
arithmetic.
Definition 5.2. Given a language τ , let τtup be the three-sorted language with sorts M , a
τ -structure; N , a structure in the language of arithmetic; and Mtup, a structure representing
tuples from M . The sort Mtup is equipped with a length function ∣ ⋅ ∣∶Mtup → N and an
indexing relation ind ⊆Mtup ×N ×M ; we interpret ind(π,n,m) as saying that the nth entry
of π is m.
Definition 5.3. Let Ttup be the τtup-theory which consists of the following formulas:
1. N ⊧ PA−,
2. Mtup consists of N -indexed sequences from M :
(a) for all π ∈Mtup, i ∈ N , and m ∈M , if ind(π, i,m) then i < ∣π∣.
(b) for all π ∈Mtup, i ∈ N , andm,m′ ∈M , if ind(π, i,m) and ind(π, i,m′) thenm =m′.
(c) for all π ∈Mtup and i ∈ N , if i < ∣π∣ then there is m ∈M such that ind(π, i,m).
(d) for all π, ρ ∈Mtup, if ∣π∣ = ∣ρ∣ and for all i < ∣π∣ = ∣ρ∣ there is m such that ind(π, i,m)
and ind(ρ, i,m) then π = ρ.
(e) there is π ∈Mtup with ∣π∣ = 0.
(f) for all π ∈Mtup and m ∈M , there is ρ ∈Mtup with ∣ρ∣ = ∣π∣ + 1, ind(ρ, ∣π∣,m), and
for all i < ∣π∣ and m, ind(π, i,m) if and only if ind(ρ, i,m).
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(g) for all π ∈Mtup with ∣π∣ ≥ 1, there is ρ ∈ Mtup with ∣ρ∣ = ∣π∣ − 1, and for all i < ∣ρ∣
and m, ind(π, i,m) if and only if ind(ρ, i,m).
In a model A of Ttup, we write A, AN , and AMtup for the underlying sets of the three
sorts. The theory Ttup implies that given π ∈Mtup and i < ∣π∣, there is a unique m such that
ind(π, i,m); we write π(i) = m. This is the ith entry of the tuple π. The axioms also say
that natural operations such as the concatenation of π by a single element m, πˆm, exists,
or that π without its last entry, π−, exists. We can also view elements of the sort N as tuples
using the standard coding of tuples of natural numbers.
Definition 5.4. Given a τ -structure M = (M, . . .), we consider M<N = (M,N,M<N) a
τtup-structure with the natural interpretation of the language.
There is a natural generalization of end extensions of models of arithmetic to models of
Ttup with a fixed first coordinateM. The structureM<N plays the same role as the standard
natural numbers here, i.e., every model is an end extension of M<N. We will just prove the
facts that we need rather than developing a full theory of end extensions. We will also want
to expand the language a little more by adding a unary relation R on the arithmetic sort N ,
and a binary function g∶N ×Mtup →M . It is important that the range of the function g is
M , the only sort which is fixed under end extensions. Let τ∗tup = τtup ∪ {R,g}.
The following lemma proves that M<N is the smallest model with M-sort M. One could
adapt the conclusion of the theorem to make a definition of what it means to be an end-
extension in this context.
Lemma 5.5. Let A = (A,R, g, . . .) be a τ∗tup-structure which is a model of Ttup with AM =M.
There is a unique embedding of (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) into A which is the identity on the sort
M . Moreover, viewing M<N as a substructure of A:
• AN is an end extension of N, and
• each π ∈ AMtup with ∣π∣ ∈ N has π ∈M<N.
Proof. Since AN is a model of PA−, it is an end extension of N, and so there is a unique
embedding of N into AN .
We define, by induction on ∣π∣, an embedding f ∶M<N → AMtup . By 2(d) there is a
unique ε ∈ AMtup with ∣ε∣ = 0. Define f(⟨⟩) = ε. Given π ∈ M<N of length n + 1, define
f(π) = f(π−)ˆπ(n).
Now viewing M<N as a substructure of A, to see that if π ∈ AMtup has ∣π∣ ∈ N, then
π ∈M<N, we argue by induction on ∣π∣. For ∣π∣ = 0 this is clear. Given π with ∣π∣ = n + 1, we
have that π− ∈M<N. Thus π = π−ˆπ(n) ∈M<N.
As in models of arithmetic, the Π1 formulas play an important role relative to end ex-
tensions. Since in this context the first sort is fixed, we allow any kind of quantifiers over
the first sort, but only universal quantifiers (or bounded quantifiers) over the last two sorts.
By a bounded quantifier over tuples, we mean that the lengths of the tuples are bounded.
Definition 5.6. We define the Π1 τ∗tup-formulas inductively:
• any finitary quantifier-free formula;
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• (∃x ∈M)ϕ or (∀x ∈M)ϕ where ϕ is Π1;
• (∀x ∈ N)ϕ or (∀π ∈Mtup)ϕ where ϕ is Π1;
• (∃x ∈ N,x < t)ϕ or (∃π ∈Mtup, ∣π∣ < t)ϕ where ϕ is Π1.
These are all elementary first-order formulas.
As in arithmetic, if an end extension satisfies a Π1 formula with parameters in the smaller
model, then the smaller model satisfies the same formula.
Lemma 5.7. Let A = (A,R, g, . . .) be a τ∗tup-structure which is a model of Ttup with AM =M.
Let ϕ be a Π1 formula of τ∗tup. Given a¯ ∈ M<N, if A ⊧ ϕ(a¯), then (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ϕ(a¯).
Proof. By Lemma 5.5, we can view (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) as a submodel of A satisfying the
end extension properties.
We argue by induction on ϕ. Suppose that A ⊧ ϕ(a¯). If ϕ is finitary quantifier-free, then
A ⊧ ϕ(a¯) if and only if (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ϕ(a¯).
If ϕ is of the form (∃y ∈ M)ψ(x¯, y), then there is b ∈ M such that A ⊧ ψ(a¯, b). Then,
as ψ is Π1, (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ψ(a¯, b) and hence (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ϕ(a¯). A similar
argument works when ϕ is of the form (∀y ∈M)ψ(x¯, y).
If ϕ is of the form (∀y ∈ N)ψ(x¯, y), then given b ∈ N, we have A ⊧ ψ(a¯, b). Thus(M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ψ(a¯, b). So (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ϕ(a¯). The same argument works
when ϕ is of the form (∀π ∈Mtup)ψ(x¯, π).
If ϕ is of the form (∃y ∈ N,y < t)ψ(x¯, y), then m = t(a¯) ∈ N. Since A ⊧ (∃y ∈ N,y <
m)ψ(a¯, y), there is b ∈ N such that A ⊧ ψ(a¯, b). Since ψ is Π1, (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ψ(a¯, b).
Hence (M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ ϕ(a¯). The same argument works, using the fact that each
π ∈ AMtup with ∣π∣ ∈ N is in M<N, when ϕ is of the form (∃π ∈Mtup, ∣π∣ < t)ψ(x¯, π).
5.3 Encoding Computable Infinitary Sentences
We are now ready for the main construction of this section. The idea is as follows. Given
a computable ⩕-sentence ϕ in a language τ with no existential quantifiers, we encode that
sentence into a finitary sentence in the language τtup. Essentially, we will write down (making
use of the model of arithmetic and tuples in a τtup-structure) a finitary τtup-sentence ψ which
expresses the truth conditions for ϕ. The sentence will be Π1. Thus, given a τ -structure M,
we will have M ⊧ ϕ if and only if M<N ⊧ ψ (by checking that ψ does in fact express the
truth conditions for ϕ in this model) if and only if there is some A ⊧ ψ ∧ Ttup with AM =M
(because ψ is Π1). We can then show that ϕ defines a pseudo-elementary class. In fact,
by relativizing we can apply this argument to any ⩕-sentence because every such sentence
is C-computable for some C; this is what we use the relation R in τ∗tup for. For existential
quantifiers, we need to make use of Skolem functions for truth definitions of ϕ; this is what
we use the function g in τ∗tup for. There are also some extra complications when the language
τ is infinite.
We begin with the following lemma which does most of the heavy lifting.
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Lemma 5.8. If ϕ is a C-computable ⩕-sentence in a language τ , then there is a sequence
of Π1 τ∗tup-formulas χ, {θs ∣ s ∈ N} such that for all τ -structures M,
M ⊧ ϕ⇐⇒ (∃g∶N ×M<N →M)(∃R ⊆ N)
[(M<N,R, g) ⊧ {χ} ∪ {θs ∣ s ∈ N} ∪ {n ∈ R ∣ n ∈ C} ∪ {n ∉ R ∣ n ∉ C}].
Before proving this lemma, we show how to use it together with results from the previous
section to get Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.1. Let K be a class of structures closed under isomorphism. The following are
equivalent:
• K is both a pseudo-elementary (PC∆) class and Lω1ω-elementary.
• K is defined by a ⩕-sentence.
Proof. It is immediate that if K is defined by a ⩕-sentence ϕ, then it is Lω1ω-elementary.
We show that K is a PC′∆-class, and by Theorem 2.12, it is then a PC∆-class. Let C be such
that ϕ is a C-computable ⩕-sentence. The expanded language is τ∗tup = τtup ∪ {R,g}, where
R is a unary relation symbol on N and g is a binary function symbol N ×Mtup →M . Then,
given a τ -structure M, by Lemma 5.8, if M ⊧ ϕ then there are R and g such that
(M<N,R, g) ⊧ {χ} ∪ {θs ∣ s ∈ N} ∪ {n ∈ R ∣ n ∈ C} ∪ {n ∉ R ∣ n ∉ C}.
In particular, there is an expansion of M to a model of these sentences together with Ttup.
On the other hand, suppose that there is (A,R, g) a model of Ttup together with these
sentences. Let M = AM . Then, by Lemmas 5.5 and 5.7, and using the fact that χ and the
θs are Π1,
(M<N,R↾N, g↾N×M<N) ⊧ {χ} ∪ {θs ∣ s ∈ N} ∪ {n ∈ R ∣ n ∈ C} ∪ {n ∉ R ∣ n ∉ C}.
Thus M ⊧ ϕ. So we have shown that K is PC′∆, as defined by these sentences and Ttup.
On the other hand, if K is both a PC∆-class and Lω1ω-elementary, then by Corollary 4.5,
it is defined by a ⩕-sentence.
We now prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5.8. Fix a C-computable sentence code (T, l, v) for ϕ such that for no σ ∈ T
do we have l(σ) = ⌜⩔⌝. We may assume that τ is relational, say consisting of {Ri ∣ i ∈ N}.
Let {ψn}n∈N be an effective listing of all formulas that are finite disjuncts of atomic and
negated atomic formulas over τ . That is, we can write,
ψn ⇐⇒
k(n)
⋁
m=1
Pℓ(n,m)(xi(n,m,1), . . . , xi(n,m,r(ℓ(n,m))))
where Pj range among the relations Ri and their negations, and the functions k, ℓ, i, and r
are all computable.
16
The function g is supposed to represent a Skolem function for ϕ. A Skolem function,
as defined in Definition 2.8, is a function which assigns to each σ ∈ T and partial valuation
v with domain v(σ) an element of M (which is supposed to be the new value of xi if
l(σ) = ⌜∃xi⌝). It will be convenient to view g as a function of σ and any partial valuation,
with the property that g maps any two valuations which agree on v(σ) to the same element
of M; the two points of view are interchangeable. We can express that g is such a function
with the following Π1 sentence χ:
(∀σ ∈ T )(∀u, v ∈Mtup)[[∣u∣, ∣v∣ ≥max(v(σ)) ∧ (∀j ∈ v(σ))u(j) = v(j)]Ð→ g(σ,u) = g(σ, v)].
To see that this sentence is Π1, we use Theorem 5.1: T and v(σ) are C-computable, and
v(σ) is finite with a computable upper bound.
Define θs to be the sentence
(∀σ ∈ T )(∀t ≥ s ∈ N)(∀ρ ∈Mtup)[ξ → ζ]
where ξ and ζ are defined below. This sentence will essentially say that for all sequences σ of
natural numbers, and t, and sequences of tuples ρ, if (this is ξ) σ is a path through T ending
in a leaf and ρ gives a partial valuation of the first t variables for each node on the path σ of
the appropriate kind for a truth definition, then (this is ζ) the partial valuation at the leaf
on σ makes the corresponding atomic formula true (with respect to the finite sublanguage
consisting of the first s relations of τ). One should view ρ as a length ∣σ∣+1 tuple of t-tuples,
each t-tuple being a partial valuation. The formula ξ is
∣ρ∣ = t∣σ∣ + t ∧ (∀i)σˆi ∉ T ∧ (∀i < ∣σ∣)t ≥max(v(σ↾i)) ∧
(∀i < ∣σ∣)(∀k < t)[l(σ↾i) = ⌜⩕⌝Ð→ ρ(it + t + k) = ρ(it + k)] ∧
(∀i < ∣σ∣)(∀j, k < t, j ≠ k)[[l(σ↾i) = ⌜∀vj⌝ ∨ l(σ↾i) = ⌜∃vj⌝]Ð→ ρ(it + t + k) = ρ(it + k)] ∧
(∀i < ∣σ∣)(∀j < t)[l(σ↾i) = ⌜∃vj⌝Ð→ ρ(it + t + j) = g(σ↾i, ⟨ρ(it), ρ(it + 1), . . . , ρ(it + t − 1)⟩)]
The formula ζ is
∀j[l(σ) = ⌜ψj⌝Ð→
(∃m ≤ k(j))
2s
⋀
h=1
h = ℓ(j,m) Ð→ Ph(ρ(t∣σ∣ + i(j,m,1)), . . . , ρ(t∣σ∣ + i(j,m, r(h))))].
Essentially ζ is a satisfaction predicate. One has to see that θs can be expressed in a Π1 way.
To see this, note that many of the functions and relations appearing in the formula, such as
the functions j ↦ ⌜∀vj⌝ and σ ↦ max(v(σ)), the relation σ ∈ T , and so on, are computable
or C-computable. The theory Ttup proves that σ↾i and ⟨ρ(it), ρ(it + 1), . . . , ρ(it + t − 1)⟩ are
unique, if they exist. From these facts, standard manipulations allow us to write θs in a Π1
way.
We now show that χ and {θs ∣ s ∈ N} work as desired. First, suppose that M ⊧ ϕ. Let
f be a truth definition for (T, l, v) in M with Skolem function g. We may expand g to be
defined on pairs (σ, η), where η is an arbitrary partial valuation, by setting g(σ, η) = g(σ, η∗)
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where η∗ is η restricted to v(σ) (and by choosing any value when η is not defined on all of
v(σ)). Thus (M,C, g) ⊧ χ. Fix s for which we claim that (M<N,C, g) ⊧ θs. Suppose that
we have σ, t, and ρ satisfying the antecedent. For each i ≤ ∣σ∣, let ηi be the partial valuation
that maps xk to ρ(it + k). We claim, by induction, that f(σ↾i, ηi) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ ∣σ∣. For
i = 0, we have that f(∅, η0) = 1 since M ⊧ ϕ and ϕ has no free variables. Suppose that
f(σ↾i, ηi) = 1. We have a number of cases:
• We cannot have l(σ↾i) = ⌜ψ⌝ unless i = ∣σ∣.
• If l(σ↾i) = ⌜∃xk⌝ then since f(σ↾i, ηi) = 1, for a = g(σ↾ i, ηi), we have f(σ↾i ˆ0, ηxk↦a) = 1.
As σ↾i+1∈ T , σ↾i+1= σ↾i ˆ0. Also, ηi+1 = η
xk↦a
i . So f(σ↾i+1, ηi+1) = 1
• If l(σ) = ⌜∀xi⌝ then since f(σ↾i, ηi) = 1, for each a ∈ M, f(σ↾i ˆ0, ηxk↦ai ) = 1. Once
again, σ↾i+1= σ↾i ˆ0, and ηi+1 = η
xk↦a
i for some a.
• If l(σ) = ⌜⩕⌝ then since f(σ↾i, ηi) = 1, for each k with σ↾i ˆk ∈ T , f(σ↾i ˆk, ηi) = 1.
Since σ↾i+1= σ↾i ˆk for some such k and ηi+1 = ηi, f(σ↾i+1, ηi+1) = 1.
Thus we have that f(σ, η∣σ∣) = 1. Fix ψj such that l(σ) = ⌜ψj⌝. Since f(σ, η∣σ∣) = 1, we
have that ψj is true with the valuation η∣σ∣. So there is some m ≤ k(j) with Pl(j,m)(ρ(t∣σ∣ +
i(j,m,1), . . . , ρ(t∣σ∣ + i(j,m, r(h))))).
Second, suppose that M ⊭ ϕ. We claim that for each g with (M<N,C, g) ⊧ χ there is
s such that (M<N,C, g) ⊭ θs. Fix g with (M<N,C, g) ⊧ χ. We will define a sequence of
finite strings σ0 ⊆ σ1 ⊆ ⋯ ⊆ σn in N<N, and partial valuations ηi, such that for each i there
is no truth definition f with Skolem function g on the subtree below σi with f(σi, ηi) = 1.
As before, even though ηi might have in its domain more than the free variables v(σi), by
abuse of notation we can still write f(σi, ηi) and g(σi, ηi). Begin with σ0 = ∅, t0 = 0, and
η0∶ ∅ →M the trivial valuation. As M ⊭ ϕ, there is no f on T with f(σ0, η0) = 1. Given σi,
ti, and ηi, define σi+1, ti+1, and ηi+1 as follows.
• If l(σi) = ⌜ψ⌝, then end the construction.
• If l(σi) = ⌜∃xj⌝ then let σi+1 = σiˆ0 and ηi+1 = ηxj↦ai , where a = g(σi, ηi). Since there is
no f with f(σi, ηi) = 1, there is no f with f(σi+1, ηi+1) = 1.
• If l(σi) = ⌜∀xj⌝ then there is a ∈ M such that there is no f with f(σiˆ0, ηxj↦ai ) = 1. Let
σi+1 = σiˆ0 and ηi+1 = η
xj↦a
i .
• If l(σi) = ⌜⩕⌝ then there is k with σˆk ∈ T such that there is no f with f(σiˆk, ηi) = 1.
Let σi+1 = σiˆk and ηi+1 = ηi.
Since (T, l, v) is well-founded, eventually this construction ends with σ0 ⊂ ⋯ ⊂ σn and
η0, . . . , ηn. Since σn is a leaf, l(σn) = ⌜ψj⌝ for some j. Then since there is no truth defi-
nition f with f(σn, ηn) = 0, if l(σn) = ⌜ψj(x¯)⌝, then M /⊧ηn ψj(x¯). Let σ = σn. Let t be
the number of variables appearing in ηn. We can consider each ηi as a tuple of length t by
assigning each unassigned variable to a fixed element of M. Let ρ = η0ˆ⋯ˆη1. Let s be suffi-
ciently large that all of the relations Ph appearing in ψj have h < s. Then, by construction,
this choice of σ, t, and ρ falsify θs.
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If we start with a computable formula in a finite language, we do not need any reference
to the set C, and we only need one θ rather than the infinitely many θs from before.
Lemma 5.9. If ϕ is a computable ⩕-sentence in a finite language τ , then there is a Π1
τtup-formula θ such that for all τ -structures M,
M ⊧ ϕ⇐⇒ (∃g∶N→M)[(M<N, g) ⊧ θ].
Proof. We can use the same proof as Lemma 5.8, but since the language is finite, we only
need a single sentence θs for some sufficiently large s; so take θ to be the conjunction of χ
with this formula. Moreover, we can replace R by ∅ as ϕ is ∅-computable.
This lemma proves Theorem 1.4 in the same way that Lemma 5.8 proves Theorem 1.1; it
is important here that PA− and the axioms for Ttup consist of only finitely many sentences.
Finally, we prove Theorem 1.8.
Theorem 1.8. Let K be a class of structures closed under isomorphism. The following are
equivalent:
• K is a PC′-class which is closed under substructures,
• K is axiomatized by a computably enumerable universal theory.
Proof. If K is a PC′-class which is closed under substructures, then by Theorem 1.7, it is
axiomatized by a set of universal sentences. Let φ be such that K is the class of reducts of
models of φ; by listing out the consequences of φ, we can enumerate a set T of universal
sentences which follow from φ.
On the other hand, suppose that K is axiomatized by a computably enumerable universal
theory T . By Corollary 1.5, K is a PC′-class, and since it is axiomatized by a universal theory,
it is closed under substructures.
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